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ABSTRACT
Based on the Bertrand and Cournot economic models, we develop an evasion game model 
for a duopoly market with two players competing on price and quantity. We show that if 
the total financial strength of first mover is greater than that of the second mover, and the 
first mover observes the second mover perfectly, our proposed optimal strategy can be 
followed by the first mover to remain the market leader ahead of all competition.
Keywords: Evasion game, optimal strategy, duopoly competition, Bertrand and Cournoteconomic models
about their environment and competitors. 
This competition model is used mainly 
for competition among firms, but it is also 
applicable in solving individual financial 
decision problems (Masud et. al, 2012). 
The assumption of perfect observation 
in a duopoly market is considered by 
Anders Udo Poulsen (2007). There is also 
a trend to discuss and criticise the Bertrand 
and Cournot oligopolistic models; for a 
discussion on this see Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990) and van Damme and Hurkens (1999).
A basic model of commitment is to 
convert a two-player game in strategic form 
to a leadership game with the same pay-offs, 
in which one player (the leader) commits to 
INTRODUCTION
There is a vast body of literature on first- 
and second-mover competition in a duopoly 
market (Guth et al.,2006; von Stengel, 
2010). Dolores Alepuz and Amparo Urbano 
(1999) considered imperfect observation 
for firms in a duopoly market in real life to 
show that these firms were willing to learn 
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a strategy while the other player chooses the 
best reply. The recent paper by Bernhard von 
Stengel and Shmuel Zamir (2010) studies 
such leadership games for games with 
convex strategy sets. In this paper, we set the 
strategy as being that the first mover remains 
the leader in the market based on the evasion 
differential games with two other players. 
Firms can compete on many variables. 
Luca Lambertini and Andrea Mantovani 
(2006) considered competition on quantity 
and sticky price based on the Cournot and 
Bertrand models. Here we use the same 
variables and propose a model along with 
a strategy for competition on price and 
quantity based on evasion differential 
games. To gain the result, some basic 
assumptions are set in our mathematical 
model. Each player has its own constraint 
and the gamr is dynamic as in the games 
considered by Isaacs (1999).
The paper consists of four sections 
including introduction, statement of the 
problem, main result and conclusion. In the 
introduction, we discuss the Bertrand and 
Cournot duopoly models and show that their 
assumptions are mostly in compliance with 
our model . In the second section, we state 
the problem by integrating the Bertrand and 
Cournot models, and in the third section, 
we propose an optimal strategy for the 
first mover in three different time periods. 
Finally, in the last section, we summarise 
the whole paper.
The Bertrand competition model versus 
the evasion model
Based on Bertrand’s classical oligopoly 
theory of price competition, there should be 
at least two firms producing un-differentiated 
products in a market. It is assumed in this 
model that cooperation among firms is not 
allowed and market demand belongs to the 
firm which offers the lowest price. Marginal 
cost in the Bertrand duopoly model is 
assumed to be the same for all firms. This 
last assumption is not valid in our evasion 
model, in which the marginal cost for the 
first mover is less than that of the second 
mover due to greater financial strength of the 
first mover rather than that of second mover, 
which will be discussed later in this paper.
In Bertrand’s model, the first mover 
enjoys a monopoly on price in an uncontested 
environment. As a result, the entire market 
share goes to the first mover, which means 
that there is no need for the first mover to 
set any strategies.
When the second mover happens to 
enter the market, a price war between the 
second and first movers ensues due to 
assumed homogeneity of the product. The 
Bertrand model illustrates that the Nash 
equilibrium point occurs twice during the 
competition. It happens once when the first 
and second movers try to collude to share 
the market equally (half-half), and again 
when both firms reach the same marginal 
cost below which competition causes them 
a loss.
In Bertrand’s duopoly competition 
model, the players compete solely on 
prices above marginal cost rather than on 
monopoly price. As mentioned earlier, in 
our evasion model, the first mover has the 
advantage of a better market share, and will 
not let the second mover take over its place 
in the market. The first mover does what 
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it can to maintain its lead in the market. 
Therefore, the first mover tries to keep 
its price lower than the second mover’s. 
If the second mover sets its price above 
the monopoly price, the first mover will 
capture the entire market demand, but if 
it sets its price below the monopoly price, 
then, assuming perfect observation, the first 
mover will reduce its price, and by doing so, 
maintain the bigger market share.
The Cournot competition model versus the 
evasion model
The Cournot model,named after Antoine 
Augustin Cournot,rests on quantity, where 
firms in the market are about to set the 
optimal quantity to maximise their profit. 
Homogeneity of product is assumed in 
this model. The duopoly competition that 
is considered in this model overlapsour 
evasion game in the following ways.
As the game is assumed to be sequential, 
the first mover enters the market and 
captures the entire demand. The quantity the 
product produced is based on the monopoly 
price until the second mover enters the 
market as well. When this happens, market 
demand will be shared between the first and 
second movers, while the first mover tries 
to remain the market leader with greater 
pay-offs. This makes evaluating the residual 
demand critical for the first mover,who 
needs perfect observation once again as 
assumed in our model.
In Cournot’s model, it can be seen that 
the second mover has no output quantity 
before entering the market, and the best 
output is what the first mover assigns to 
produce to serve the market demand. When 
the second mover comes in and produces an 
output quantity, the optimal output for the 
first mover must be decided from an estimate 
of the residual demand of the market. The 
first mover must then reduces its output 
quantity up to the level where together, both 
players are producingthe same quantity of 
products as that used to be produced by the 
first mover originally. The second mover 
might try to increase output in the hope of 
edging out the first player or causing the first 
player’s output to gradually decrease. As it 
is assumed in this paper that the first mover 
has the privilege of financial strength, the 
output quantity of the first mover is given as 
being greater than that of the second mover. 
Therefore, the first mover can maintain its 
lead by using our evasion model.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Competition in a duopoly market is seen 
mainly in benefits (price) and market share 
(sale quantity). The major difficulty with 
existing models of the duopoly market is 
that they are restricted to competition on one 
of the above factors. In the Cournot model, 
competition is based only on quantity, 
whereas in the Bertrand model it is solely 
on price. The problem is the lack of a hybrid 
model which can handle competition based 
on the coordinates of qantity and price 
simultaneously.
Setup of the model
We consider both the Bertrand and Cournot 
economic models to propose a mathematical 
model for the duopoly market where the two 
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players compete on both coordinates of price 
and quantity. As mentioned earlier, the first 
mover is assumed throughout the game to 
observe the second mover perfectly, so that 
it can set its price and residual demand based 
on data gathered through this observation 
of the second mover in order to find the 
optimal pay-off that will allow it to remain 
the market leader.
Our differential evasion game model 
assigns appropriate strategies in different 
periods of time to let the first mover take 
action based on the actions of the second 
mover to maintain its lead in the market 
with a pay-off. In our mathematical model, 
the first and second movers can take action 
or respond according to both the coordinates 
of price and quantity.
The first mover has to avoid being 
captured by the second mover. Based on the 
Bertrand and Cournot competition models, 
the two players (firms) might compete 
strategically on price and quantity in a 
duopoly market. As mentioned before, the 
Nash equilibrium in these economic models 
can be reached, but our mathematical model 
gives the first mover a maths-simulated 
strategy so that it can be ahead of the second 
mover all the time. The equilibrium point, 
in particular, never happens in this model, 
since the equilibrium is where the pursuer 
(second mover) catches the evader (first 
mover), which is prohibited in our model. 
In contrast to the usual firm competition 
models, here the aim is to simulate a 
mathematical model to show that it is 
possible for the first mover to remain the 
market leader considering better financial 
strength and our optimal strategy.
Restrictions of the model
Some of the standard assumptions of the 
Bertrand and Cournot models are assumed, 
as well as certain extra assumptions which 
naturally happen in the real market. These 
conditions are as follows: the firms are 
producing homogeneous products; the 
firms are not involved cooperation or joint 
ventures during the game; and the outputs 
affect the price i.e. each firm has market 
power. We only deal with two players 
(firms) and there are constraints both for 
the first and second movers which will be 
specified in the next section.
There are a few different games for 
duopoly competition including the sequential 
and coincidental games (Amir & Stepanova 
2006). The sequential game fits with our 
evasion model. We assume that there are 
two players in our model to simulate a 
duopoly market,which consists of two 
firms. The most important assumptions are 
sequentiality as well as perfect observation 
of moves in the game.
Implications of using the model
We are not aware of any research that 
models the duopoly market by differential 
evasion game strategically in the vast 
amount of literature on game theory and 
the duopoly market. In the next section, 
we propose an optimal strategy for the 
first mover to remain advantageous over 
its competition. This model has a clear 
advantage to both the Bertrand and Cournot 
models as it allows change in both price and 
quantity during computation. Our model has 
some restrictions (mentioned above) but it 
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is still applicable in many real competition 
setups. The main implication of our analysis 
of competition in the duopoly market is the 
rigorous proof that even if both competitors 
are free to play over price and quantity, if the 
first mover is financially privileaged at the 
beginning, it will remain the market leader.
MAIN RESULT
In this section we propose a mathematical 
model to simulate the integrated economic 
models of Bertrand and Cournot. This is 
a mathematical model of rivalry between 
the first and second movers in a dynamic 
market, which is a simple motion dynamic 
system based on the dynamism of a duopoly 
market.
The moves of the second mover, S , and 
the first mover, F , follow these equations:
0
0
: = , (0) = ,
: = , (0) = ,
S x u x x
F y v y y

               (1)
where 2,,, ∈vuyx , 00 yx ≠ , u  is the 
control parameter of the second mover, S , 
and v  is that of the first mover, F .
Definition 1 
A measurable function 2)[0,: →∞v  
such that
1/2
2
1
0
| ( ) | ,v s ds
∞ 
≤ Ω 
 
∫
is called an admissible control of the first 
mover, F , where 1Ω  is the financial 
strength of the first mover.
Similarly, a measurable function 
2)[0,: →∞u  such that
1/2
2
2
0
| ( ) | ,u s ds
∞ 
≤ Ω 
 
∫
is called an admissible control of the 
second mover, S , where 2Ω  is the financial 
strength of the second mover.
Definition 2
By the strategy of the first mover, F , is 
meant a function ),,(= uxyVV ,
,: 2222  →××V
for which the system
0
0
= , (0) = ,
= ( , , ), (0) = ,
x u x x
y V y x u y y


has a unique absolutely continuous 
solution ( )( ), ( )y t x t , for arbitrary admissible 
control S  of the second mover, S . The 
strategy, V , is called admissible if each 
control generated by V  is admissible.
Definition 3
Evasion for the first mover, S . from the 
second mover, S , is possible if there exists 
a strategy, V , of the first mover, F , such 
that )()( tytx ≠ , 0>t , for any admissible 
control S  of the second mover, S .
In the above definitions, the positions 
of the first and second movers at time t  are 
denoted as )(ty  and )(tx , respectively. 
In our problem the position of each mover 
is its market share, which is less for the 
second mover when competition starts. In 
this situation, the market share privilege for 
the first mover causes its successful evasion 
from the second mover.
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Proposition 4
If ,> 21 ΩΩ  then the evasion for the first 
mover, F , from the second mover, S , is 
possible in the game (1).
We prove the theorem in three steps.
.1o  Construction of the first mover’s strategy
Denote the first and second coordinates 
of the competition strategy on quantity 
and price by qv  (respectively, qu ) and 
pu  (respectively, pu ) for the first mover 
(respectively, second mover). We consider 
the vector ),(= pq vvv  of the first mover 
as a function of the vector ),(= pq uuu  of 
the second mover. Consider the parameter 
1/2<<0 δ  as a fixed threshold of the 
market share defined willingly by the first 
mover. In addition, the cost that is imposed 
onthe first mover due to competing on 
quantity and price is denoted by ω , which 
will be specified later. We assume τ  as the 
first time that the second mover takes over 
market share,δ .
Now, we construct the strategy of the 
first mover as follows:
( )
( )
(0,0) 0 < ,
| ( ) |, | ( ) | , < ,( ) =
0,| ( ) | , ,
q p
if t
u t u t if tv t
u t if t
τ
δω ω τ τ
ω
δτ
ω
≤



 + + ≤ +



 ≥ +
where ω  is chosen to satisfy the condition
2 2
10
| ( ) |v s ds
∞
≤ Ω∫ .
In the above-mentioned strategy, 0  
implies the manual strategy of the first 
mover regardless of the move of the second 
mover. In addition, |)(| tuq  is the quantity 
that the second mover sets below that of the 
first mover because of its cost disadvantage. 
No matter how the second mover tries 
to increase its quantity, the first mover is 
able to observe the quantity of the second 
mover and produce the residual demand that 
was calculated by Cournot in his model. 
Moreover, |)(| tu p  is price that the second 
mover sets below that of the first mover.
.2o  Evasion is possible for the first mover
At the first, in our mathematical model we
estimate )()( txty − , 
ω
δττ +≤ <t , which
shows the difference between the position 
(market share) of the first and second 
movers in the given time interval. Since
( ) ( )
t t
v s ds v s ds
τ τ
≤∫ ∫
( ) ( ) ( )1/2 1/2 1/22 2 1( ) 1 ,t tv s ds ds tτ τ τ≤ ≤ Ω −∫ ∫
we have
( ) ( )y t x t−
= ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
y v s ds x u s ds
τ τ
τ τ+ − −∫ ∫
( ) ( ) ( )
t
y x v s ds
τ
τ τ≥ − − ∫
( )1/21( ) 2 .
t
u s ds t
τ
δ τ− ≥ − Ω −∫
This inequality holds if 2 21| ( ) |
t
v s ds
τ
≤ Ω∫ , 
and 2 22| ( ) |
t
u s ds
τ
≤ Ω∫ .
On the other hand, for the points 
),(= pq xxx  a n d  ),(= pq yyy a s  t h e 
positions (including quantity and price) of 
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the second and first movers in the market 
competition, we have
( ) ( )y t x t− ( ) ( )q qy t x t≥ −
= ( ) ( ) ( | ( ) |) ( )
t t
q q q qy x u s ds u s dsτ ττ τ ω− + + −∫ ∫
( ) ( ) ( | ( ) |)
t
q q qy x u s dsττ τ ω≥ − + +∫
| ( ) | ( ).
t
qu s ds tτ ω τ− ≥ −∫
Therefore,
( ){ }1/21( ) ( ) 2 , ( )y t x t max t  tδ τ ω τ− ≥ − Ω − −
2
2
1
> , ( < ).
9
 tω δ δτ τ
ω
≤ +
Ω
Moreover, if ,
ω
δτ +≥t  then
)()( txty ≠ , and
( ) ( )p px t y t−
( ) ( )
t
p pu s ds u s ds
δτ
ω
δτ τ
ω
δ
+
+
≤ + +∫ ∫
( ) ( )
t
p pv s ds v s ds
δτ
ω
δτ τ
ω
+
+
− −∫ ∫
= ( ) ( )
t t
pu s ds u s dsδ δτ τ
ω ω
+ +
−∫ ∫
( )
t
pu s dsδτ
ω
+
≤ ∫
1/22 2
( ) ( )
t t
q pu s ds u s dsδ δτ τ
ω ω
+ +
    
− +    
     
∫ ∫
.
In the above estimations, we used the 
following calculations.
| ( ) |
t
u s dsδτ
ω
+∫
= | ( ) | ( )
t t
s ds s dsδ δτ τ
ω ω
φ φ
+ +
≥∫ ∫
= | ( ) | , | ( ) |
t t
q pu s ds u s dsδ δτ τ
ω ω
+ +
 
 
 
∫ ∫
1/22 2
= | ( ) | | ( ) | ,
t t
q pu s ds u s dsδ δτ τ
ω ω
+ +
    
+    
     
∫ ∫
where ( )|)(||,)(|=)( susus pqϕ .
If ( ) > 0,
t
qu s dsδτ
ω
+∫  then it is clear 
from the above result that ( ) ( ) < 0.p px t y t−
If ( ) = 0,
t
qu s dsδτ
ω
+∫ and for some
,
ω
δτ +≥t  then 0=)(suq  almost 
everywhere on [ , ].tδτ
ω
+  In this case,
)()( txty pp ≥ , ,ω
δτ +≥t  and
( ) ( )y t x t−
( )= 0, ( )t qy v s dsδτ
ω
δτ
ω +
 + + 
  ∫
( )( ), ( )t q px u s u s dsδτ
ω
δτ
ω +
 − + − 
  ∫
2
= [ q qy x
δ δτ τ
ω ω
    + − +    
    
( p py x
δ δτ τ
ω ω
   + + − +   
   
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( ) 2 1/2( ) ( ) ) ]t p pv s u s dsδτ
ω
+
+ −∫
2
[ q qy x
δ δτ τ
ω ω
    ≥ + − +    
    
2
1/2]p py x
δ δτ τ
ω ω
    + + − +    
    
2
2
1
= > .
9
 y xδ δ δ ωτ τ
ω ω
   + − +    Ω   
Consequently, the absolute value of 
difference between market share of the first 
and second movers remains always positive 
in the given time periods. In other words, 
there is no time, t , in the intervals in which 
the difference becomes zero. As a result, 
the market share of the second mover will 
never be greater than or even equal to that 
of the first mover.
.3o  Admissibility
The admissibility of the proposed strategy 
means that it should satisfy the integral 
constraint, which is estimated using the 
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality as follows:
2
0
| ( ) |v s ds
∞
∫
( ) ( )( )
2
= ,q pu s u s
δτ
ω
τ
ω ω
+
+ +∫
( )( )
2
0,ds u s dsδτ
ω
∞
+
+ ∫
( )
1/2
22 2 {[ | |q u s ds
δτ
ω
τ
ω δ ω
+ 
≤ +  
 
∫
( )
1/2
2| | ]pu s ds
δτ
ω
τ
+ 
+  
 
∫
( ) ( )( )2 1/2 2 2[ 1 ] } q pds u s u s ds
δτ
ω
τ τ
+ ∞
⋅ + +∫ ∫
2 2
1 2 12 4 ,ω ω≤ + Ω +Ω ≤ Ω
where 22
2
1142 Ω−Ω≤Ω+ ωω  which 
shows a relationship between ω , as the 
cost that is imposed on the first mover due 
to competing on quantity and price, and the 
financial strength of both players.
Therefore, the first mover remains the 
market leader in a duopoly competition 
throughout  the game, and the proof of the 
proposition is complete.
CONCLUSION
In the duopoly market, there are many 
uncontrollable conditions which make the 
rivalry game somewhat unpredictable. 
However, investigating a two-player game in 
real-life business needs some assumptions, 
such as perfect observation of both players 
and sequentiality of moves. Still, in reality, 
regardless of which strategy a firm might 
embark on, nearly all of the strategies are 
based on competing on quantity and price 
of products or services offered by the firms. 
Bertrand and Cournot were two researchers 
with different models about competition 
on price and quantity along with some 
assumptions as mentioned in this paper.
In this paper on duopoly competition, 
the privilege of the first mover in financial 
strength is assumed and an optimal strategy 
is set, such that the first mover remains 
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ahead of the game throughout. However, it 
needs to bear the coordination of cost to do 
so and enjoy uncontested competition. We 
proposed here a mathematical model, in 
which duopoly competition was simulated, 
optimal strategy of the first mover was 
constructed and admissibility of the strategy 
was proved.
REFERENCES
Alepuz, D., & Urbano, A. (1999). Duopoly 
experimentation: Cournot competit ion, 
Mathematical Social Sciences, 37, 165-188. 
Amir, R., & Stepanova, A. (2006). Second-mover 
advantage and price leadership in Bertrand 
duopoly, Games and Economic Behaviour, 55, 
1-20. 
Guth, W., Muller, W., & Spiegel, Y. (2006). Noisy 
leadership: An experimental approach, Games 
and Economic Behavior, 57, 37-62. 
Hamilton, J., & Slutsky, S. (1990). Endogenous 
timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot 
equilibria, Games and Economic Behaviour, 2, 
29-46. 
Isaacs, R. (1999).Differential games: A mathematical 
theory with applications to warfare and pursuit, 
control and optimization. New York: Dover 
Publications. 
Lambertini, L., & Mantovani, A. (2006). Identifying 
reaction functions in differential oligopoly 
games, Mathematical Social Sciences, 52, 252-
271. 
Masud, J., Sulaiman, H., Abdul Hamid, T.A.T., & 
Ibrahim, R. (2012). Financial behaviour and 
problems amongst the elderly in Malaysia, 
Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and 
Humanities, to appear.
Poulsen, A.U. (2007). Information and endogenous 
first mover advantages in the ultimatum game: 
An evolutionary approach, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 64, 129-143. 
van Damme, E., & Hurkens, S. (1999). “Endogenous 
Stackelberg leadership,” Games and Economic 
Behaviour, 28, 105-129. 
von Stengel, B. (2010). Follower payoffs in symmetric 
duopoly games, Games and Economic Behaviour, 
69, 512-516. 
von Stengel, B., & Zamir, S. (2010). Leadership 
games with convex strategy sets, Games and 
Economic Behaviour, 69, 446-457. 

